Untitled Document

	The reasons for the defeat (1944-1946) In order to interpret the development in Greece during the period from mid 1944 until the beginning of civil war in 1946 it is necessary to say a few things about the previous period and the situation in the party. First of all we should answer the issue form the movement’s point of view. Many times we have been obliged to face the attempts of the system to re-write history in the last years. And despite it has been more than 60 years since then there is a growing interest by many people about what really happened then and why. We need to clarify two main issues here. Two great events determined and shaped the political development in Greece during the 20th century. The first one was the Asia Minor or Anatolia Disaster (a term we use to describe the invasion of the Greek Army under the imperialists direction and the final defeat with the disastrous results for the peoples both in Turkey and Greece in 1922). The second was the struggle for national liberation and people’s rule during the 40’s. The defeat of the Greek bourgeoisie in 1922 shaped the limits and the framework within which the development of Greek capitalism could be structured according the features of the Greek bourgeoisie and its relations with the imperialist centers. On one hand the Greek bourgeoisie was obliged to accept the restricted limits of activity and initiative in the Balkan region and on the other –mainly- to embed the features of dependence and complete submission to the imperialist centers because another factor that had started challenging the power relations within the country had been added to the already serious problems it had to face. It was the emergence and the building up of the communist movement in Greece during the years 1920-1940. It gave new qualitative features in class struggle that had already been driven to a higher level. The communist movement in Greece had a tumultuous course of constant internal struggle. The Trotskyites played a significant role in this struggle and they had managed to almost dissolve the party. Only after the intervention of the COM intern things changed and the party started recovering and growing again. That is why there was this glorious resistance movement in Greece against the German occupation. Still there were some problems that had to be interpreted. There were two arguments regarding the stance of the then leadership. First they said that the people were tired from the fight against the fascists and accepted fatalistically the new occupation because of its supremacy in weapons. The other one is that the Soviets – and Stalin particularly – had already come to an agreement with the British and the US to distribute the world and that is why they wouldn’t support the armed struggle. There is a lot of evidence – particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union – that neither such an agreement existed or the Soviet Union kept a stance against it. Because there was an armed struggle that lasted -despite the problems- for more than three years and the movement was defeated only after the direct intervention of the US with money, weapons and direct control of the whole thing. We believe that the main issue in this case wasn’t the supremacy in weaponry or the external help and the treason. These arguments all they do is trying to obscure the real problem that was the political will and analysis of the then party leadership. Because the collision with the imperialists came despite the efforts of the CPG leadership to avoid the dilemma; what was the purpose of the national liberation struggle and how much determined they were to continue it until its implementation? That leadership failed to solve this dilemma not because of a supposedly erroneous class analysis on the Greek society. If that was what happened it could not have managed to organize a mass resistance movement. This leadership couldn’t solve it because it remained captive to its ill-being awe in front of its opponent and mainly because it didn’t have faith in the unfailing strength of a people that essentially had already surpassed it. We should quote some historic data here in order to make it easier to understand. First of all the party with its 6th plenum in July 1941 started organizing the glorious resistance of the Greek people. It was certain that there would be some kind of resistance against the triple occupation (Italy, Germany and Bulgaria). A resistance, organized, collective, of that size and magnitude without the leadership of the communists it wouldn’t have existed. Since the 6th plenum there was a clear reference and relation of the struggle for national liberation with the challenge for social emancipation. Still it had to be proved in life. The CPG leadership in front of the dilemma of the people seizing the power preferred to make maneuvers and avoided to answer this issue in a clear, long term way; it avoided to move decisively to that direction and get prepared. Particularly when the foreign factor was the key issue in Greece that had to be faced, in order to solve the internal political problem and to seize the socio-political power. Exactly in this issue the then leadership followed a completely erroneous policy, of retreat and compromise, lack of a deep understanding of the complex character of the war; its changes, shifts and perspectives. When the military chiefs – in the eve of the G-PLA (ELAS) establishment set the question of what kind of an army this would be (a national liberation army and overthrow a government or a whole system-these are the exact words they used) – although they didn’t quite understand it – they had set the core of the future problem-dilemma. An intense debate started and the outcome was that “we’ll see and we’ll do”. The CPG leadership made the main aspect of joining the anti-Hitler coalition an absolute position and refused to discuss and face the issue comprehensively. The British tried and managed to establish –despite the constant opposition and pressure – a remarkable information network and they undermined the Greek revolutionary movement. In May 1944 in the Lebanon Conference the leadership of the United Anti-fascist Front (EAM in Greek) was obliged to discuss the liquidation of people’s power in the countryside and join a government with the traditional political parties that had been dissolved by the pre-war dictatorship. The stance of the bourgeois parties’ representatives was infuriating; every speech was an anticommunist delirium – they underestimated the heroic struggle of the Greek people and equalized the partisans with the traitors that had collaborated with the occupation. The persons that had led EAM and ELAS were accused for their struggle and their contribution in the liberation of their country. The resolutions of that conference were a serious retreat for the party which signed an agreement, without any substantial reason, for a national unity government. This brought serious problems. A. they recognized to the British to right to intervene in the internal affairs of the country and the establishment of a national army – the G-PLA should dissolve. In September 26th the Caserta agreement was signed. It was another disastrous error of the then leadership. The G-PLA was put under the control of the national unity government, the British headquarters in the Middle East and Scobey. British troops were allowed to land in Greece a little later. In November 1944 the British unfolded their plans to break down (ELAS) G-PLA. Scobey ordered ELAS to surrender their weapons or he would declare martial law. In early December the collaborators of the German occupation, saved from the people’s verdict by the British attacked and murdered activists in a demonstration in Athens. It was the beginning of a great heroic fight of the people in Athens for 33 days. Again the leadership acted unforgivably. Instead of consolidating the forces that fought against the new conqueror (the British) they left the militia and the reserve forces to face the British and the reactionary and traitorous forces. ELAS was outside Athens and could have changed things but the order to fight never came. In February 1945 the Varkiza agreement was signed, GPLA surrendered their weapons and dissolved. From that point on the reaction suppressed, arrested, tortured and murdered thousands partisans, communists and progressive people. The civil war started almost two years later with the known outcome. The British imperialists and the local reaction weren’t enough to break the Greek people. So it was necessary for the US to intervene. It took them two years to manage this. Many things have been said about the Soviet Union and its stance. The worst accusation made by the party is that they were asking the Soviet observers what to do and the stayed neutral. They wouldn’t suggest anything. This can’t be a serious argument for someone who wishes to change the future of the country and establish a new society. Many things have been said about Stalin, too. However in an article published in a Greek newspaper in 2003 referring to the “Diary of Georgi Dimitrov”, Yale University Press, page 497, it says. Kostov asked: Will the Americans let the partisans win? Stalin: No-one will ask them. If they have enough forces to win and if there are people able to mobilize these forces then the struggle should go on. We have discovered recently many similar statements in the dirty propaganda of the official media.

The reasons for the defeat (1944-1946)

In order to interpret the development in Greece during the period from mid 1944 until the beginning of civil war in 1946 it is necessary to say a few things about the previous period and the situation in the party.

First of all we should answer the issue form the movement’s point of view. Many times we have been obliged to face the attempts of the system to re-write history in the last years. And despite it has been more than 60 years since then there is a growing interest by many people about what really happened then and why.
We need to clarify two main issues here. Two great events determined and shaped the political development in Greece during the 20th century. The first one was the Asia Minor or Anatolia Disaster (a term we use to describe the invasion of the Greek Army under the imperialists direction and the final defeat with the disastrous results for the peoples both in Turkey and Greece in 1922). The second was the struggle for national liberation and people’s rule during the 40’s.
The defeat of the Greek bourgeoisie in 1922 shaped the limits and the framework within which the development of Greek capitalism could be structured according the features of the Greek bourgeoisie and its relations with the imperialist centers. On one hand the Greek bourgeoisie was obliged to accept the restricted limits of activity and initiative in the Balkan region and on the other –mainly- to embed the features of dependence and complete submission to the imperialist centers because another factor that had started challenging the power relations within the country had been added to the already serious problems it had to face. It was the emergence and the building up of the communist movement in Greece during the years 1920-1940. It gave new qualitative features in class struggle that had already been driven to a higher level.
The communist movement in Greece had a tumultuous course of constant internal struggle. The Trotskyites played a significant role in this struggle and they had managed to almost dissolve the party. Only after the intervention of the COM intern things changed and the party started recovering and growing again. That is why there was this glorious resistance movement in Greece against the German occupation. Still there were some problems that had to be interpreted.
There were two arguments regarding the stance of the then leadership. First they said that the people were tired from the fight against the fascists and accepted fatalistically the new occupation because of its supremacy in weapons. The other one is that the Soviets – and Stalin particularly – had already come to an agreement with the British and the US to distribute the world and that is why they wouldn’t support the armed struggle. There is a lot of evidence – particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union – that neither such an agreement existed or the Soviet Union kept a stance against it. Because there was an armed struggle that lasted -despite the problems- for more than three years and the movement was defeated only after the direct intervention of the US with money, weapons and direct control of the whole thing.
We believe that the main issue in this case wasn’t the supremacy in weaponry or the external help and the treason. These arguments all they do is trying to obscure the real problem that was the political will and analysis of the then party leadership. Because the collision with the imperialists came despite the efforts of the CPG leadership to avoid the dilemma; what was the purpose of the national liberation struggle and how much determined they were to continue it until its implementation?
That leadership failed to solve this dilemma not because of a supposedly erroneous class analysis on the Greek society. If that was what happened it could not have managed to organize a mass resistance movement. This leadership couldn’t solve it because it remained captive to its ill-being awe in front of its opponent and mainly because it didn’t have faith in the unfailing strength of a people that essentially had already surpassed it.
We should quote some historic data here in order to make it easier to understand.
First of all the party with its 6th plenum in July 1941 started organizing the glorious resistance of the Greek people. It was certain that there would be some kind of resistance against the triple occupation (Italy, Germany and Bulgaria). A resistance, organized, collective, of that size and magnitude without the leadership of the communists it wouldn’t have existed.
Since the 6th plenum there was a clear reference and relation of the struggle for national liberation with the challenge for social emancipation. Still it had to be proved in life.
The CPG leadership in front of the dilemma of the people seizing the power preferred to make maneuvers and avoided to answer this issue in a clear, long term way; it avoided to move decisively to that direction and get prepared. Particularly when the foreign factor was the key issue in Greece that had to be faced, in order to solve the internal political problem and to seize the socio-political power. Exactly in this issue the then leadership followed a completely erroneous policy, of retreat and compromise, lack of a deep understanding of the complex character of the war; its changes, shifts and perspectives.
When the military chiefs – in the eve of the G-PLA (ELAS) establishment set the question of what kind of an army this would be (a national liberation army and overthrow a government or a whole system-these are the exact words they used) – although they didn’t quite understand it – they had set the core of the future problem-dilemma. An intense debate started and the outcome was that “we’ll see and we’ll do”. The CPG leadership made the main aspect of joining the anti-Hitler coalition an absolute position and refused to discuss and face the issue comprehensively.
The British tried and managed to establish –despite the constant opposition and pressure – a remarkable information network and they undermined the Greek revolutionary movement.
In May 1944 in the Lebanon Conference the leadership of the United Anti-fascist Front (EAM in Greek) was obliged to discuss the liquidation of people’s power in the countryside and join a government with the traditional political parties that had been dissolved by the pre-war dictatorship. The stance of the bourgeois parties’ representatives was infuriating; every speech was an anticommunist delirium – they underestimated the heroic struggle of the Greek people and equalized the partisans with the traitors that had collaborated with the occupation. The persons that had led EAM and ELAS were accused for their struggle and their contribution in the liberation of their country. The resolutions of that conference were a serious retreat for the party which signed an agreement, without any substantial reason, for a national unity government. This brought serious problems. A. they recognized to the British to right to intervene in the internal affairs of the country and the establishment of a national army – the G-PLA should dissolve.
In September 26th the Caserta agreement was signed. It was another disastrous error of the then leadership. The G-PLA was put under the control of the national unity government, the British headquarters in the Middle East and Scobey. British troops were allowed to land in Greece a little later.
In November 1944 the British unfolded their plans to break down (ELAS) G-PLA. Scobey ordered ELAS to surrender their weapons or he would declare martial law.
In early December the collaborators of the German occupation, saved from the people’s verdict by the British attacked and murdered activists in a demonstration in Athens. It was the beginning of a great heroic fight of the people in Athens for 33 days. Again the leadership acted unforgivably. Instead of consolidating the forces that fought against the new conqueror (the British) they left the militia and the reserve forces to face the British and the reactionary and traitorous forces. ELAS was outside Athens and could have changed things but the order to fight never came.
In February 1945 the Varkiza agreement was signed, GPLA surrendered their weapons and dissolved.
From that point on the reaction suppressed, arrested, tortured and murdered thousands partisans, communists and progressive people.
The civil war started almost two years later with the known outcome. The British imperialists and the local reaction weren’t enough to break the Greek people. So it was necessary for the US to intervene. It took them two years to manage this.
Many things have been said about the Soviet Union and its stance. The worst accusation made by the party is that they were asking the Soviet observers what to do and the stayed neutral. They wouldn’t suggest anything. This can’t be a serious argument for someone who wishes to change the future of the country and establish a new society.
Many things have been said about Stalin, too. However in an article published in a Greek newspaper in 2003 referring to the “Diary of Georgi Dimitrov”, Yale University Press, page 497, it says.
Kostov asked: Will the Americans let the partisans win?
Stalin: No-one will ask them. If they have enough forces to win and if there are people able to mobilize these forces then the struggle should go on.
We have discovered recently many similar statements in the dirty propaganda of the official media.